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Abstract 
This study assesses the performance of supply chains for ginger and large cardamom, two major 
export crops produced in Nepal. In particular, it aims to identify factors that constrain marketing 
choices available to smallholders, so limiting the chain’s robustness from their perspective. A 
qualitative case study method was used to gather and analyse data on farmer-buyer dyads in the 
ginger and cardamom chains. These case studies were informed by a conceptual model based on 
Transaction Cost Economics. The analysis included a cross-case comparison to identify the effects 
of external attributes on the modes of engagement available to smallholders. Informal market 
trading was the only mode of smallholder engagement observed in both chains. However, there was 
evidence that smallholders had previously engaged in relational contracts in the ginger chain, and 
in ‘captive’ relational contracts in the cardamom chain. The analysis suggests that access to other 
modes of engagement is constrained mainly by under-investment in value-adding assets. 
Traditional cooperatives can and do help to resolve problems of asymmetric information and high 
unit transaction costs, but more innovative cooperative models are required to encourage the 
investment needed to finance value-adding assets and activities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
1
  
 
Linkages between producers and markets are becoming increasingly coordinated to meet growing 
demands for high quality, safe food (Reardon et al., 2005; Shepherd, 2007; Woods, 2004). 
However, such shifts are seldom beneficial to smallholders who struggle to meet the costs imposed 
by these demands (Markelova et al., 2009; Pingali et al., 2005; Poulton et al., 2006; Shepherd, 
2007; Vorley et al., 2009). This is cause for concern as agriculture remains a major source of 
livelihood for most of the rural poor in developing countries (World Bank, 2007), and linking them 
to markets will be crucial in sustaining their livelihoods and promoting both rural and urban food 
security (Wheatley and Peters, 2004). It is therefore important to identify ways of maintaining and 
promoting smallholder engagement in food supply chains. 
                                                          
Corresponding author’s 
Name: Michael C. Lyne 
Email address: michael.lyne@lincoln.ac.nz  
  
Asian Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
 
 
 
journal homepage: http://aessweb.com/journal-detail.php?id=5005  
 
Asian Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development, 5(4)2015: 88-102 
89 
 
Literature relating to chain performance tends to focus on whole chain issues and seldom considers 
performance from a smallholder perspective (Aramyan et al., 2006; Cadilhon et al., 2006; Chan 
and Qi, 2003; Gunasekaran et al., 2004; Lohman et al., 2004). This study takes a smallholder view 
and specifically examines the ability of supply chains to sustain smallholder engagement. The study 
focuses on the dyad between growers and their immediate buyers. A chain is defined as robust if it 
has one or more modes of engagement that sustain smallholder participation in the farmer-buyer 
dyad. A chain that offers smallholders a range of such modes, each with its own risk-reward 
profile, is considered to be more robust than one that offers smallholders few marketing choices. 
 
This study draws on a conceptual model based on Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1979; 
1985) to analyse information gathered in case studies of supply chains for ginger and large 
cardamom in Nepal. Large cardamom and ginger are Nepal’s second and fourth most important 
agricultural export crops respectively (Trade and Enterprise Promotion Centre, 2012). Both crops 
are suited to production on small farms, and government policy recognises the need to 
commercialise such high value crops to raise smallholder incomes and to promote rural 
development in Nepal (APROSC and JMA, 1995; Joshi et al., 2004). The purpose of this paper is 
to understand why certain modes of engagement are (or are not) used by smallholders in order to 
identify effective ways of improving their access to markets. 
 
2. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
The conceptual employed in this study extends the traditional vertical coordination continuum to 
incorporate missing transactions and informal market transactions (Bhattarai et al., 2013) The 
model is illustrated in Figure 1 where The segments of the pie represent different modes of 
producer-buyer engagement in the vertical coordination continuum. These modes of engagement 
are distinct from dyads which are the interface between two exchange partners. Multiple dyads do 
not necessarily mean multiple modes of engagement. The model distinguishes between informal 
markets and spot markets. Spot markets tend to be characterised by rigorous trading rules and 
product standards that support frequent and impersonal transactions based on prices. Informal 
markets, on the other hand, lack rules and standards. Transactions conducted in these markets tend 
to be personalised and cash-based to mitigate behavioural risk. Transactions via conventional 
contracts usually involve relatively simple terms that can be expressed in writing and enforced by a 
court of law. Relational contracts involve complex, recurring transactions with implicit terms that 
require internal enforcement. Vertical integration shifts coordination decisions and their 
enforcement to managers. 
 
Figure 1 models vertical coordination as a continuum that progresses from ‘no-transaction’ to the 
informal market, spot market, conventional contracting, relational contracting and vertical 
integration. The model highlights the relationships between the drivers of transaction costs and 
modes of engagement between sellers and buyers, recognizing that the absence of transactions 
provides valuable information about what it might take to create sustainable dyads. Anticlockwise 
shifts from one segment to the next are driven by the frequency and complexity of transactions, 
asset-specific investment and hold-up problems associated with behavioural and environmental 
risk. Transaction costs are expected to increase with increases in the levels of these drivers, 
motivating tighter coordination between sellers and buyers. At some point, vertical coordination 
gives way to vertical integration, which may well collapse if environmental risks are too high 
(Truong, 2012). The conceptual model to analyse modes of engagement applies to individual 
agents in a chain, and a chain is therefore expected to host a variety of modes of farmer-buyer 
engagement as transaction costs, risks and risk aversion vary between individuals and locations. A 
chain in which smallholders continue to engage with buyers via multiple modes of engagement 
suggests that they are able to exercise utility-improving choices. Conversely, a chain that does not 
engage smallholders in multiple modes may well signal limited choice and hence scope for prudent 
interventions to promote smallholder participation. While it is possible that a single, resilient mode 
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of engagement could provide all farmers with a superior outcome, empirical study would be 
required to check this proposition.  
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Figure 1: Modes of engagement between farmers and buyers 
Source: Bhattarai et al. (2013) 
 
3. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
A qualitative, case study research strategy was adopted as the intention was to generalise the 
findings of the study to propositions rather than to a population, and the propositions address ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions about smallholder participation in supply chains (Yin, 2009). Selection of the 
supply chains for case study was therefore purposive to ensure both theoretical and literal 
replication of the conceptual model’s propositions. In each case, the primary unit of analysis was 
the farmer-buyer dyad. Producers and buyers, including potential buyers, were treated as sub-units 
in the embedded, multiple-case design. 
 
Data were gathered from May to June 2011 in personal, semi-structured interviews conducted with 
farmers, managers of marketing cooperatives, buyers, potential buyers, government extension 
officers and staff working for NGO’s. Further details about the study sites and respondents are 
provided in an overview of the ginger and cardamom chains presented in the next section.  
Interviews were recorded and later transcribed and coded using NVivo software to facilitate data 
retrieval and analysis. The analysis followed the approach suggested by Yin (2009) of searching for 
patterns in the data and comparing or contrasting observed patterns with those predicted by theory. 
In this way, theoretical propositions (such as those summarised by the conceptual model illustrated 
in Figure 1) can be confirmed or rejected. If rejected, the data may suggest alternative propositions, 
shifting the focus of the analysis to ‘theory building’. The ginger and cardamom chains were 
analysed separately, followed by a cross-case comparison aimed at isolating the effects of external 
attributes on the observed modes of engagement. 
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4. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAINS  
 
This section provides a brief overview of the chains studied. The aim is not to provide 
comprehensive information about these chains but to understand the nature of relationships 
between producers and their buyers. The terms ‘producers’ and ‘buyers’ refer only to case study 
respondents. 
 
4.1. Ginger 
The first case study was conducted with the Bhairab Ginger Producers’ Cooperative in the Palpa 
district, a major ginger producing district of Nepal. Interviews were conducted with five farmers, 
the manager of the Cooperative, two executives of the district federal cooperative, three traders 
(including a potential buyer) and three officials of government and non-government agencies. 
Ginger production in the case study area intensified in the early 2000s when an NGO implemented 
a donor funded project in the district. The cooperative was established in 2004 with 109 small 
ginger growers, and operates a collection depot in Bhairabsthan village. Volumes sold increased 
from 15 to 77 tons between 2004 and 2011. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of observed and recent dyads. In previous years, the 
producers’ marketing cooperative sold both fresh ginger and processed (dried and sliced) ginger. 
However, at the time of the study, only fresh ginger was still being sold (dyad 3b in Table 1). A 
potential dyad for dried ginger failed to materialize when negotiations between the cooperative and 
an Exporter broke down. Another potential marketing channel also failed to materialize when talks 
between a federal cooperative and a local noodle factory failed to produce a trading relationship. 
These potential dyads are omitted from Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of observed farmer-buyer ginger dyads 
Dyad 
characteristics 
Local trader 
dyad (1) 
Federal 
Cooperative 
dyad (2) 
Exporter 1 
dyad (3a) 
Wholesale 
trader dyad 
(3b) 
Contract Verbal Written Written Verbal 
Contract with Trader 
Federal 
Cooperative 
Cooperative Cooperative 
Product Fresh Fresh Sliced and dried Fresh 
Price 
Prevailing 
market price 
Negotiated price 
valid for a week 
Fixed price 
negotiated for a 
year 
Negotiated for 
each 
transaction 
Payment 
At the time of 
transaction 
Part advance and 
final payments 
settled monthly 
Part advance and 
full payment on 
delivery 
Part advance 
and full 
payment 
before dispatch 
Extension advice 
from buyer 
No No No No 
Financed by buyer No No No No 
Asset specific 
investment by  
seller 
None 
In building and 
equipment 
through grant 
funding 
In building and 
equipment 
through grant 
funding 
In building and 
equipment 
through grant 
funding 
Asset specific 
investment by  
buyer 
None None 
Investment in 
organic 
certification, 
drying 
equipment 
None 
Information None Price, volume Quality Price and 
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exchange requirement, 
delivery 
schedule 
quantity during 
negotiation 
Next buyer Wholesalers Indian traders 
Importers in US 
and Austria 
Indian traders 
 
4.2. Large cardamom 
The second case study was conducted in Ilam district in eastern Nepal, a major cardamom 
producing district bordering India. Interviews were conducted with six farmers, three immediate 
buyers and four key informants working for government and non-government agencies involved in 
large cardamom promotion. There was no evidence of collective marketing in the cardamom chain. 
Small cardamom growers sell to district traders based in market centres along the highway. They 
also sell to exporters in Birtamod (a major cardamom trading hub in the southern plains) and 
village traders. Nepalese exporters sell to traders based in various Indian cities. However, all three 
dyads exhibited very similar relationship characteristics (Table 2). Potential export links to 
countries other than India had not materialized. 
 
Farmers and traders used to engage in a practice known as Dahadani. In terms of this practice, 
forward purchase was negotiated at an agreed price or a promise to buy at a prevailing market 
price, and buyers would advance cash or foodstuffs to farmers on credit. However, this practice no 
longer exists and buyers no longer finance producers. Farmers stated that Dahadani exposed them 
to opportunistic pricing, both in selling cardamom and in purchasing foodstuffs from the buyers. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of observed farmer-buyer cardamom dyads 
Characteristics 
Exporter dyad 
District trader dyad 
Village trader dyad 
Contract Verbal 
Contract with Trader 
Price Negotiated for each transaction 
Payment At the time of transaction 
Extension advice from buyer No 
Financed by buyer No 
Asset specific investment by producers 
Low for most farmers but high for those who grow 
cardamom in their arable lands 
Asset specific investment by the buyer 
Limited in processing by exporters, none by other 
buyers 
Information exchange Price and quantity at the time of negotiation 
Next buyer 
Indian traders for exporters, Exporters for district 
traders 
District traders and exporters for village traders 
 
5. CHAIN ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Ginger 
Modes of engagement in the ginger chain switched from informal market transactions to relational 
contracts and back to informal market transactions. There was no evidence of spot market trading 
or conventional contracting. Transactions with a new ginger exporter did not materialize even 
though the product met the importer’s requirements. Similarly, transactions with a noodle factory 
did not materialize despite the efforts of a federal cooperative to engage this buyer. Figure 2 relates 
the observed and failed dyads to modes of engagement proposed by the conceptual model. 
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Prior to the donor-funded project in the early 2000s, low yields and the absence of collective 
marketing obliged small farmers to sell fresh ginger to local traders. The farmers lacked market 
information and their exposure to opportunistic behavior grew as the project increased both the size 
and frequency of their transactions in this informal market. In 2004, the project established the 
Bhairab Ginger Producers’ Cooperative (a marketing cooperative) and linked it to a district-level 
federal cooperative. The federal cooperative aggregated the output of several marketing 
cooperatives and negotiated a relational contract with a large wholesaler attracted by the sizeable 
crop and low unit transaction costs. The relational contract required the buyer to make payments in 
advance of delivery. This shifted risk from growers to the buyer, suggesting that collective 
marketing via cooperatives afforded the growers more bargaining power. Repeat transactions and 
ex post price renegotiation when prices were bullish provided some internal enforcement measures 
to encourage contract compliance.  
 
Increasing frequency 
of transactions
Increasing complexity 
of transactions
Increasing behavioural 
and environmental risk
Increasing asset 
specificity
No transaction
Exporter 2
Food company
Informal market
Local trader
Wholesaler
Failed relational 
contract
Exporter 1
Federal cooperative
 
Figure 2: Observed and failed modes of engagement and their drivers in the ginger chain  
 
However, inadequate internal enforcement, high costs of collective action (that were not financially 
viable without project support) and high levels of environmental risk (caused by frequent policy 
changes affecting the importation of fresh ginger into India) led to the demise of this dyad after just 
three years. The marketing cooperative resorted to trading its (smaller) volumes directly with 
wholesalers. In addition, grant funding enabled the cooperative to purchase driers and to negotiate a 
relational contract with Exporter 1 to sell sliced dry ginger. This relational contract was driven by 
the complexity of transactions as the importers specified stringent quality, volume and schedule 
requirements. Asset specific investment in organic certification by Exporter 1 also encouraged 
relational contracting. This dyad certainly offered growers a more stable pricing regime than did 
the volatile fresh ginger market. 
 
Despite its advantages, the dry ginger dyad also collapsed after three years. Its failure was 
prompted by inconsistent quality due to poor sanitation and inappropriate drying, and to 
inconsistent volume and delivery. These environmental risks were attributed to under-investment in 
value-adding equipment as the driers were too small to maintain a regular supply of quality 
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product. In addition, bullish prices in the fresh ginger market encouraged opportunistic behavior on 
the part of producers who shifted their deliveries to wholesale traders in the fresh market, thus 
exposing the buyer (Exporter 1) to a hold-up problem. The cooperative sacrificed the long-term 
benefits of relational contracting in the dried ginger market for short-term gains in the informal 
fresh ginger market. This behavior may also explain why the cooperative was not enthusiastic 
about supplying the new ginger exporter 2. 
 
Producer opportunism during periods of rising prices and under-investment in value-adding assets 
are predictable problems in traditional marketing cooperatives as their institutional arrangements 
encourage members to maximize profits in the short-term and to avoid investments that yield 
superior returns in the long-term (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Cook, 1995; Harris et al., 1996). Nepal’s 
ginger cooperatives were established along traditional lines and are therefore prone to the horizon 
problem described by Cook (1995). The flawed institutional arrangements of these cooperatives 
appear to have contributed to the demise of relational contracts and loss of robustness in the ginger 
chain as the only investment made by the Bhairab Ginger Producers’ Cooperative was financed 
from external grants and the evidence points strongly to opportunism by the cooperative during 
periods of rising prices.  
 
When the cooperative’s relational contracts collapsed, it was left with no choice but to trade 
informally with wholesalers. Spot markets do not exist as there are no grades and standards to 
differentiate produce - fresh ginger is traded in Nepal without even removing soil from the rhizome. 
The behavioral and environmental risk that undermined relational contracts also constrained 
conventional contracting in the absence of cost-effective external enforcement. Collective 
marketing and the low complexity of transactions in the informal market help to keep transaction 
costs low even though the frequency of transactions is high.  
 
5.2. Large cardamom 
All three of the dyads observed in the cardamom chain were characterised by the attributes of an 
informal market where product standards and trading rules are poorly specified, goods are traded 
for cash, and transactions are independent of previous or subsequent transactions. There was little 
evidence of a spot market, conventional contracting or relational contracting. Prior to the advent of 
mobile telephones, however, the cardamom chain was dominated by Dahadani - a dyad omitted 
from the conceptual model. Although Dahadani represented a form of relational contracting, the 
evidence suggested that the relationship was built on asymmetric information and was not fair to 
farmers. Figure 3 illustrates observed dyads in the cardamom chain. 
 
At first glance, Dahadani appeared to be a beneficial relational contract for farmers as it gave them 
access to finance and an assured market. However, farmers perceived the interest charges and 
prices offered by buyers to be unfair, and were obliged to commit a part of their next crop to 
redeem loans if their current crop fell short of expectations. Buyers, it seems, had an information 
advantage. The attributes of the Dahadani system suggest that this type of relationship can be best 
described as a ‘captive relational contract’. The relationship was not driven by mutual 
interdependence or by efforts to jointly create value, but by a combination of asymmetric 
information and the absence of alternative sources of credit. Expansion of mobile phone technology 
reduced the cost of information as farmers could readily ask alternative local buyers about prices. 
In addition, alternative sources of credit emerged and farmers were no longer dependent on finance 
from traders. As a result, the captive Dahadani system collapsed. 
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Figure 3: Observed and failed modes of engagement and their drivers in the large cardamom 
chain 
 
When this happened, farmers switched to informal market trading that offered them better terms. A 
true relational contract did not develop due to the absence of asset specific investment amongst 
buyers, and high levels of environmental risk in production due to crop diseases and price volatility 
caused by shifts in production and demand in India (and possibly in other countries). Production 
and price uncertainty also make it harder to anticipate contingencies and therefore raise the cost of 
both relational and conventional contracting. 
 
While mobile phone technology alleviated the problem of asymmetric price information in the 
farmer-buyer dyad, farmers and supporting agencies claimed that prices were not competitive as 
their buyers supply a small number of exporters who control the links to Indian markets. In their 
view, these exporters are large, well informed and collude to keep new entrants out of the market. 
Buyers, on the other hand, claimed that their prices reflected supply and demand in Indian markets.  
 
Perceptions of asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviour by exporters would tend to 
discourage farmers from making value-adding investments. If farmers under-invest because they 
perceive a problem of asymmetric information, then potential solutions are to disseminate credible 
market information and to strengthen farmers’ bargaining power through collective marketing. On 
the other hand, if farmers under-invest because the premiums for value-adding are genuinely too 
low, then a potential solution is to reduce the unit costs of value-adding and of engaging in more 
complex transactions by pooling their produce and marketing it collectively (the ginger chain 
highlighted the role that producer cooperatives could play in value adding and attracting preferred 
buyers). In either case, collective marketing could play an important role in developing contractual 
relationships between producers and buyers further down the chain. Higher levels of investment 
would, however, also require that marketing cooperatives be structured in ways that encourage 
investment by farmers and, perhaps, by strategic partners.  
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Lack of confidence in the prices offered by exporters may also have contributed to the absence of 
well-defined grades and standards (as they would be of little value) and, consequently, to the 
absence of spot markets. Following the demise of captive relational contracts, cardamom farmers in 
Ilam were left with informal trading as their only marketing channel. 
  
5.3. Conceptual model revisited 
The cardamom case study revealed a mode of engagement omitted from the conceptual model 
illustrated in Figure 1, Dahadani – a ‘captive’ form of relational contracting. This mode of 
engagement was associated with buyer opportunism to take advantage of asymmetric information 
and the absence of alternative sources of credit. The captive relational contract observed in the 
cardamom chain differs from the captive supply contract described by Gereffi et al. (2005) which 
was aimed at adding value by strengthening the capacity of small producers to meet rigorous 
product specifications. In the case of Dahadani, the captive relationship fits the lower end of the 
vertical coordination continuum as the risk-reward profile of the informal market was preferred to 
that of Dahadani. Figure 4 offers a revised version of the conceptual model.  
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Figure 4: Revised conceptual model 
 
6. CROSS-CASE COMPARISON 
 
At the time of the study, the informal market was the only mode of engagement available to 
smallholders in either chain, yet the pathways leading to this outcome were quite different in each 
chain. In the ginger chain, producers switched from the informal market to relational contracting 
and back to the informal market when relational contracts collapsed. In the large cardamom chain, 
producers switched to the informal market from a captive form of relational contracting. This 
section focuses on external attributes (Table 3) that could have contributed to this outcome through 
their effects on transaction costs. 
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 Table 3:  External attributes of observed farmer-buyer dyads in the spice chains 
Attributes Large cardamom Ginger 
Biological product attributes 
  
Product traded Dried capsules Fresh rhizome 
Crop biology 
Perennial with a long 
gestation period 
Annual 
Bulkiness Low High 
Storability Long Short 
Harvest season Once per year Once per year 
Market product attributes  
  
Product uses  
Consumption and 
industrial 
Consumption and industrial 
Product differentiation None None 
Compliance requirement None None 
Market structure 
  
Export vs. domestic Export Primarily export 
Alternative local buyers Many Many 
Alternative suppliers Many Many 
Intermediaries in the supply 
chain 
Many Many 
Grades and standards 
Basic quality standards 
enforced by buyers 
Basic quality standards 
enforced by buyers 
Enabling environment 
  
Collective marketing  No Yes 
Access to finance 
Self-help groups/Micro-
finance institutions 
Via cooperatives 
Mobile telephone  Now available Now available 
Road access 
All-weather road 
connected nearby market 
centre but not farms 
All-weather road connected 
nearby market centre but not 
farms 
Research and extension advice 
Available from 
government extension 
agency (perceived as 
weak) 
Available through cooperative  
and government agency 
Formal legal system Unavailable or costly Unavailable or costly 
 
6.1. Biological product attributes  
Large cardamom is a perennial crop that takes at least four years to produce its first economic 
harvest. Farmers dry the fruit capsules to reduce their volume and to improve their storability.  
Ginger, on the other hand, is an annual crop. Its rhizomes are bulky and cannot be stored for a long 
once harvested. However, farmers can postpone harvesting if they expect prices to rise. Although 
drying techniques are available, drying is not common. Both cardamom and ginger are harvested 
once a year and trading is seasonal. 
 
Cardamom’s long gestation period increases the level of asset specific investment made by farmers 
who grow the crop on land suited to annual crops. However, cardamom is easy to store, allowing 
farmers to wait for favourable prices and so reduce their risk of hold-up. Likewise, the ability to 
delay harvesting helps ginger farmers to avoid hold-up problems even though the crop is 
perishable. This alleviates the need to develop complex contractual arrangements in the spice 
chains. Ultimately, differences in crop biology, bulkiness and storability between cardamom and 
ginger did not alter the way producers and buyers engage in these supply chains. 
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6.2. Market product attributes 
Large cardamom and ginger are either consumed directly or as a minor input in a manufactured end 
product (such as spice blends). Even in direct consumption, they constitute a small fraction of the 
consumer’s food basket. The markets served by the surviving dyads observed in this study do not 
require a differentiated product and therefore do not impose high levels of compliance on farmers. 
India’s recent introduction of pest risk analysis (PRA) had not affected production or postharvest 
practices observed in the case studies. Interestingly, ginger is still exported without basic cleaning. 
   
In the absence of product differentiation and rigorous compliance requirements, it is easy for 
buyers and suppliers to find alternative trading partners and to transact without negotiating complex 
contractual terms. However, evidence from the ginger supply chain indicates that some markets do 
value a differentiated product (dried ginger slices). Attempts to exploit this market failed, 
apparently due to flaws in the model adopted for collective marketing. 
 
6.3. Market structure 
The observed spice chains are long, primarily serving Indian markets and involving many 
intermediaries. Cardamom prices are perceived to vary with quality (size, colour and aroma), but 
buyer-enforced quality standards are highly subjective and premiums are trivial. In the ginger 
chain, quality standards are limited to sorting and removing insect infested and rotten rhizomes. 
 
Collective marketing and mobile telephone services alleviated the problem of asymmetric 
information in the farmer-buyer dyads. However, the flow of information from export markets is 
constrained by long chains with many intermediaries that span international borders, and farmers 
were not convinced that prices offered by exporters were market related. 
 
Cardamom exporters add value by tail-clipping and grading capsules by size and colour, and ginger 
rhizomes are cleaned in India before they are sent to markets. This suggests that grades and 
standards exist further down the chain. It is not clear why grades and standards do not characterise 
upstream transactions. It may be that downstream buyers are able to capture more value by 
appropriating this function or that it is costly to enforce quality standards in small transactions with 
many suppliers. In either case, the absence of well-defined grades and standards at the farm gate 
serves to heighten concerns about the credibility of prices offered by exporters. 
    
The absence of well-defined grades and standards could also explain the absence of spot markets 
despite the presence of many suppliers and local buyers in the chain. In addition, perceptions of 
asymmetric information discourage farmers from investing in value-adding activities, which may 
have constrained the emergence of more complex contractual arrangements. 
 
6.4. Enabling environment 
Collective marketing was observed in the ginger chain, but not in the cardamom chain. At first 
glance, the apparent unimportance of collective marketing in distinguishing modes of engagement 
is surprising, as cooperation is expected to reduce unit transaction costs and to facilitate joint 
investment in value-adding assets and so lead to more complex modes of engagement. However, 
collective marketing failed to create new modes of engagement in the ginger chain despite 
increasing the volumes and frequency of transactions, and attracting large buyers. A possible 
explanation is that the cooperative was established along traditional lines with institutional 
arrangements that created a horizon problem (Cook, 1995). This institutional problem discourages 
investment in value-adding assets and encourages decision-making that favours short-term gains 
over long-run growth. Under-investment in dryer capacity and a temporary increase in the price of 
fresh ginger discouraged the cooperative from maintaining its relational contract with an exporter 
to supply dried ginger slices. Nonetheless, collective marketing in the ginger chain attracted 
preferred buyers and strengthened the bargaining power of producers, enabling them to secure 
better trading terms. In the cardamom chain, the absence of collective marketing not only precluded 
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farmer investment in value-adding assets, but also denied farmers the opportunity to bulk up 
supplies, reduce unit transaction costs and attract a preferred buyer. 
  
Cardamom producers were locked into credit relationships with buyers until micro-finance 
institutions and local saving groups emerged and provided alternative sources of credit. Likewise, 
reliable and affordable price information was unavailable before the expansion of mobile phone 
services. Access to alternative sources of credit and information helped to reduce producers’ 
dependency on buyers and was instrumental in releasing them from a captive relationship in the 
cardamom chain.  
  
All-weather roads link market centres, in these spice chains. Road access has improved following 
recent public works aimed connecting interior villages. Better access to roads should reduce 
transport costs for both producers and buyers, but is unlikely to alter the mode of engagement while 
there is under-investment in value-adding assets or a perception that prices offered by exporters 
lack credibility.  
  
Farmers received extension advice from government extension agencies in both chains, and –in the 
case of the ginger chain – from local advisors trained by the cooperative with support from a donor 
funded project. Extension advice was perceived to be weak in the cardamom chain and was 
considered to be a major reason for production uncertainty. This poor perception of extension 
advice may reflect the severity of production problems encountered by cardamom farmers. 
Research that resolves production problems combined with an improved extension service should 
improve yields and quality. However, such improvements are unlikely to create new modes of 
engagement for smallholders unless they reduce production uncertainty. 
  
There was no evidence of parties relying on the legal system to enforce contracts in either chain. 
This could reflect the absence of an efficient and affordable legal system. Improvements to the 
legal system may do little to encourage conventional contracting while crop yields and export 
markets are so uncertain. In this situation, product quality, research, extension and market 
information are first required to reduce environmental risk. 
 
In sum, the prevalence of informal market transactions appears to be the result of market product 
attributes, market structure and the cooperative model adopted for collective marketing. Collective 
marketing does help to attract large buyers and to strengthen producers’ bargaining power, but the 
traditional model of the cooperative does not appear to be very useful in sustaining more complex 
modes of engagement that could be more beneficial to producers. Interventions that improved 
producer access to credit and information created a superior mode of engagement in the farmer-
buyer dyad. While biological product attributes, road infrastructure, research and extension, and the 
formal legal system are expected to influence levels of risk and reward in existing modes of 
engagement, they appear to be less significant in altering the portfolio of modes observed in the 
spice chains. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
  
The case studies of the cardamom and ginger chains showed that these chains had been unable to 
sustain smallholder engagement in modes other than the informal market. Given the apparent 
durability of their informal markets, it is tempting to conclude that these chains are robust. 
However, an earlier study of the cardamom chain might have drawn a similar conclusion about 
captive relational contracts. When the enabling environment improved, these contracts gave way to 
informal market transactions that offered small farmers a better risk-reward outcome. This suggests 
that a chain is not necessarily robust simply because it has a durable mode of engagement. 
Durability may signal imperfections in the enabling environment that preclude superior modes of 
engagement. 
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While it is true that a single mode of engagement does not necessarily imply a lack of robustness, it 
is unlikely that any mode of engagement will be optimal for all farmers as they face different 
transaction costs and risks, and have different levels of risk aversion. The key issues are risk-
reward outcomes offered by the available modes, and whether or not the chain allows smallholders 
to choose an alternative mode of engagement, or a mix of modes, that best maximizes their utility. 
Interventions aimed at improving the robustness of supply chains should therefore seek not only to 
expand the modes of engagement available to stallholders but, as a first step, to make existing 
modes more sustainable by improving their risk-reward outcomes for small farmers. 
  
The case studies suggest that other modes of engagement are unlikely to develop while farmers 
perceive that prices are manipulated by exporters. In this situation, farmers see little point in adding 
value or establishing and complying with grades and standards. Reducing information asymmetry 
in chains serving Indian markets and complementing this information with well-defined grades and 
standards could promote local spot markets, but a substantive improvement in the performance of 
these chains from a smallholder perspective will require investment in value-adding assets and 
activities. However, value-adding requires collective marketing to spread fixed processing, 
marketing and transaction costs. It is unfortunate that Nepal adopted a traditional cooperative 
model to promote collective marketing as traditional cooperatives do not generate strong incentives 
for investment. Instead, they create incentives for producers to take advantage of high prices in spot 
and informal markets at the expense of relational contracts with long-term benefits. Such an 
outcome is entirely inconsistent with the notion of value adding, especially when contracts are 
complex and external enforcement via the legal system is not a viable alternative to internal 
enforcement. The government should consider supporting hybrid cooperative models like New 
Generation Cooperatives and investor-share cooperatives to promote collective marketing amongst 
smallholders. 
  
Restructured cooperatives might not only attract investment in value-adding assets to differentiate 
their product and operate in a premium market, but might also help to capture additional value in 
the existing chain by integrating some downstream value-adding functions and by engaging with 
large buyers further down the chain. In both cases, these cooperatives would have to collaborate 
with buyers to determine their quality requirements and work with their members to meet these 
standards. Asset specificity inherent in such investments would encourage cooperatives to seek 
contractual relationships with buyers. If the investments made by the cooperative (in value adding 
assets) and its members (in on-farm production technology) serve to reduce levels of environmental 
risk, and if the quality standards are easy to define and monitor, then conventional contracting may 
provide an alternative to relational contracting. Research, extension and information that reduce 
high levels of yield risk would also encourage conventional and relational contracting, so 
promoting chain robustness. 
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